The disposition effect and underreaction to private information by Janssen, Dirk Jan et al.
VU Research Portal
The disposition effect and underreaction to private information
Janssen, Dirk Jan; Li, Jiangyan; Qiu, Jianying; Weitzel, Utz
published in
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
2020
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103856
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Janssen, D. J., Li, J., Qiu, J., & Weitzel, U. (2020). The disposition effect and underreaction to private
information. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 113, 1-28. [103856].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103856
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Sep. 2021
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 113 (2020) 103856 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc 
The disposition effect and underreaction to private 
information  
Dirk-Jan Janssen a , Jiangyan Li b , ∗, Jianying Qiu a , Utz Weitzel a , c 
a Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Heyendaalseweg 141, Nijmegen, the Netherlands 
b School of Finance, Laboratory of Experimental Economics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Jianshan Street 217, Shahekou 
District, Dalian, China 
c Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081HV, Amsterdam, the Netherlands 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 18 July 2019 
Revised 29 January 2020 
Accepted 5 February 2020 







The disposition effect 
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a b s t r a c t 
We examine the role of the disposition effect in market efficiency following the arrival of 
private signals to a small group of informed traders. Subjects trade an ambiguous asset 
via a computer-based double auction. Using a 2 × 2 × 2 design, we endow two types of 
signal, i.e., positive vs. negative, to informed traders with two different levels of the dis- 
position effect, i.e., high vs. low, that are measured in two domains, i.e., gain vs. loss. We 
find that (1) the disposition effect measured in the gain domain has qualitatively differ- 
ent implications from the disposition effect measured in the loss domain; (2) following 
a favorable signal, informed traders with high disposition effect levels are more likely to 
sell and less likely to hold the asset while following an unfavorable signal, the opposite is 
true; (3) there is some evidence of stronger price underreaction in markets with informed 
traders with high disposition effect levels than in markets with informed traders with low 
disposition effect levels, but the effect is overall relatively weak; and finally and most im- 
portantly (4) the above results hold only when the sign of the signal matches the domain 
that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured in. 








Aggregating diversified private information into prices is perhaps the most important function of markets ( Hayek, 1945 ).
Much effort has been devoted to the design of market mechanisms that could facilitate this function. However, markets
are never perfectly efficient ( Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Lo, 2004 ). Many factors could affect the speed and the scope with
which private information is aggregated and transmitted to prices (see e.g., Bao et al., 2019; Barber and Odean, 2007; Bekaert
et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2006; Garleanu and Heje, 2018; Merkley et al., 2017 ). Identifying those factors and examining their
exact implications has been an important agenda for many researchers for decades. In this paper, we consider the disposition
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The disposition effect, as first coined in Shefrin and Statman (1985) , is defined as the tendency of investors to hold stocks
with capital losses too long and to sell stocks with capital gains too soon. The disposition effect is perhaps “one of the most
robust facts about the trading of individual investors” ( Barberis and Xiong, 2009 ). It has been observed in stock markets
( Chong, 2009; Hur et al., 2010; Odean, 1998 ), futures markets ( Choe and Eom, 2009; Chou and Wang, 2011; Frino et al.,
2004; Li and Yang, 2013 ), mutual fund markets ( Cici, 2012; Frazzini, 2006; Singal and Xu, 2011 ), and experimental asset
markets ( Chang et al., 2016; Cueva et al., 2019; Da Costa Jr et al., 2013; Fischbacher et al., 2017; Frydman and Rangel, 2014;
Hermann et al., 2019; Jiao, 2017; Pelster and Hofmann, 2018; Rau, 2015; Weber and Camerer, 1998; Weber and Welfens,
20 07a, 20 07b ). 
The possibility that the disposition effect could affect market efficiency has been well recognized ( Frazzini, 2006; Grin-
blatt and Han, 20 05; Kaustia, 20 04; Weber and Welfens, 2007b ). For a piece of private information that only a particular
trader possesses to be incorporated into market prices, the trader must initiate trades. Following positive (or negative) in-
formation, there must be sufficient buying (or selling) activities to push up (or down) prices. However, traders exhibiting
the disposition effect are likely to distort this process. They sell assets following capital gains and hold assets following
capital losses. In a market in which many traders are affected by the disposition effect, together with limits of arbitrage
( Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 ), those distortions might result in insufficient buying (or selling) pressure to push the price to
the correct level. As a consequence, price underreaction and subsequent return momentum arises ( Dacey and Zielonka,
2008; Frazzini, 2006 ), and markets become less efficient. 
We experimentally investigate the role of the disposition effect in market efficiency following the arrival of private in-
formation to a small group of informed traders. Our contribution is mainly threefold. First, we make an explicit distinction
between the disposition effect in bull markets, where most traders experience capital gains, and the disposition effect in
bear markets, where most traders make losses. For this purpose, instead of using one general measure, as in Weber and
Camerer (1998) and Weber and Welfens, 20 07a, 20 07b , we measure the disposition effect separately in the gain domain
and the loss domain. Our measurement is built on prospect theory, arguably the most popular explanation of the disposi-
tion effect. Traders behaving consistently with prospect theory use the purchasing price of an asset as the reference point
and code prices above it as gains and below it as losses. The S-shaped value function predicts a higher propensity to sell
the asset with gains due to risk aversion in the gain domain and a stronger willingness to hold the asset with losses due to
risk seeking in the loss domain, resulting a trading pattern that is consistent with the disposition effect. If prospect theory
is indeed a driving force behind the disposition effect, in bull (or bear) markets where most traders have capital gains (or
losses), only the disposition effect driven by the value function in the gain (or loss) domain is relevant. After all, decisions to
sell winning stocks and hold or buy losing stocks are, from a behavioral point of view, fundamentally different. There is no
reason to believe that traders affected by the disposition effect in bull markets are the same ones affected in bear markets.
If the disposition effect affects different populations in bear markets than in bull markets, it might result in different mar-
ket dynamics. Indeed, on the individual level investors “exhibiting a strong tendency to quit winning investments quickly
are not necessarily the same investors who stick to their losing ones” ( Weber and Welfens, 2007a , pp. 25); on the aggre-
gate level, prices underreact strongly after a positive shock, while prices underreaction is much less pronounced following
negative shocks ( Weber, Welfens, 2007 ). Further evidence can be found in Frazzini (2006) and Weber and Welfens (2008) .
Consequently, it is important to distinguish the disposition effect in the gain domain and the loss domain. 
Second, we consider the relationship between the disposition effect and market efficiency using private instead of public
signals. The link between the disposition effect and price underreaction has been shown in, among others, Grinblatt and
Han (2005) , Frazzini (2006) and Weber, Welfens, 2007 . The focus of those studies has been on the arrival of public informa-
tion. While those studies provide important insights on the existence and implications of the disposition effect, they neglect
some important points. First, as we point out in the beginning of the introduction, a primary function of markets is to aggre-
gate diversified private information rather than public information. Hence, it is essential to know the role of the disposition
effect in the translation of private information to market prices. Second, in studies relying on public signals, it is not en-
tirely clear whether and how the disposition effect directly affects market efficiency. Following public signals, market prices
generally need some time to fully reflect new information, instead of immediately jumping to the new equilibrium level,
as predicted by the efficient market hypothesis. However, it is unclear what exact role the disposition effect plays in this
process. The disposition effect is not defined by the ability to absorb information, and traders affected by the disposition
effect might process information and adjust their trading prices as quickly as other traders. Therefore, the underreaction
of market prices to public signals per se might come from factors other than the disposition effect. The results found in
works such as Weber and Camerer (1998) , Weber and Welfens, 2007a, 2007b might merely reflect a correlation of those
factors with the disposition effect. With private information, market prices adjust slowly, and the disposition effect has a
clear role in this process. Moreover, different types of signals could imply different trading dynamics. Unlike in the case of
public information, the informed traders have a distinct informational advantage over the uninformed traders. They might
construct trading strategies that could hide their information and exploit the information advantage for as long as possible
(e.g., Buffa, 2013 ). Those trading strategies might lead to a potentially stronger underreaction when signals are private rather
than public. It is interesting to see if and to what extent the disposition effect plays a role in those dynamics. 
Finally, our investigation relies on experimental asset markets instead of empirical data. An experimental approach, in
contrast to empirical methods, provides us with full control over the fundamental value of the asset, the information struc-
ture of signals, and the behavioral trait – the level of the disposition effect – of the informed traders receiving signals. Those
tight controls allow us to directly test the role of the disposition effect in market efficiency without having to worry about















































other confounding factors, such as mean reversion in beliefs, portfolio re-balancing, and trading costs. Furthermore, by ex-
amining detailed micro-structure trading data, we are able to get a comprehensive view of the whole translation process
from signals to prices and to pinpoint the steps where things go wrong. 
Our experiment consists of two main parts. In the first part, we measure the level of the disposition effect separately
in the gain and loss domains using a novel method. The basic task in our measurement method consists of playing an
ambiguous lottery for a maximum of four rounds. The ambiguous lottery is the same in all rounds and offers either a gain
or loss of 400 Experimental Currency Units (hereafter ECU). The task ends once subjects decide not to play the lottery.
Consistent with the empirical definition of the disposition effect, subjects who experience a gain in playing a lottery should
become less likely to proceed to next rounds, while subjects who experience a loss in playing a lottery should become
more likely to proceed to next rounds. To more accurately and effectively measure the level of the disposition effect, we
manipulate the outcomes of the ambiguous lottery in two out of six tasks, such that subjects face four continuous gains in
one manipulated task and face four continuous losses in the other, if subjects play to the end. 
In the second part of the experiment, nine subjects compose a market and trade an asset via a computer-based double
auction. The final value of the asset depends on the color of a randomly drawn ball from an ambiguous bowl. It is common
knowledge that three of the nine subjects are informed traders. Each market trading is divided into two phases. Subjects
trade the asset for two minutes in the first phase, then three subjects – informed traders – receive the same private signal,
and trading continues for another two minutes. Our central focus is on the implications of the informed traders disposition
effect levels on their individual trading behavior and aggregate market performance. For this purpose, we appoint informed
traders according to their levels of the disposition effect; i.e., informed traders are three subjects either with the highest
or the lowest levels of the disposition effect in a market. We consider both the disposition effect in the gain domain and
that in the loss domain. The signals that informed traders receive are of two types. A positive signal excludes a bad state
and implies the value of the asset is more likely to be high, whereas a negative signal excludes a good state, and thus
the value of the asset is more likely to be low. In the experiment, we deliberately construct markets in which the sign of
the signals (positive/negative) either matches or does not match the domain in which the levels of the disposition effect
are measured. This allows us to check whether the disposition effect measured in the two domains indeed has different
implications. To cover the whole spectrum, we run eight treatments in total with a within-subject design so that we have:
two levels (high/low) of the informed traders disposition effect levels × two domains (gain/loss) in which the disposition
effect levels are measured × two types (positive/negative) of private signals. 
Our results show that disposition effect levels measured in the two domains are not correlated, suggesting individuals
exhibit higher levels of the disposition effect in bear markets than in bull markets. In line with the disposition effect, we
find that informed traders with high disposition effect levels exhibit a significantly greater (or lower) willingness to hold
the asset following a negative (or positive) signal than informed traders with low disposition effect levels. This willingness
is evident both from the numbers and the prices of (submitted and accepted) bids and asks. Furthermore, the differences in
the trading behavior result in substantially different asset holdings between informed traders with high and low disposition
effect levels. At the aggregate market level, we observe significant underreaction following both types of private signals, and
there is no indication that prices are approaching a new fundamental value within the trading round of the double auction
market. We find some evidence that markets with informed traders with high (low) disposition effect levels experience
stronger (weaker) price underreaction. This is true following both a positive and negative signal, although the difference is
more obvious following a negative signal. Finally and most importantly, the above results hold only when the sign of private
signals (positive/negative) matches the domain in which the disposition effect levels are measured. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design, procedures and hypotheses. In
Section 3 , our results are presented and discussed. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental design 
2.1. Measuring individual disposition effect levels 
Our measure of individual disposition effect levels is based on prospect theory ( Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ). Specifi-
cally, in the basic task of our measurement method, subjects repeatedly face an ambiguous lottery which pays out either
+400 ECU or -400 ECU for a maximum of four rounds. 1 At the beginning of each round, subjects need to decide whether
or not to play the lottery. The task ends once subjects decide not to play the lottery in a round. The fundamental idea of
our measurement is that subjects who experience a gain should become less likely to proceed to next rounds, while those
who experience a loss should become more likely to proceed to next rounds, which is consistent with the definition of the
disposition effect. Our task is similar to the test of the hot-hand fallacy or the gambler’s fallacy. However, only the gambler’s
fallacy is consistent with the disposition effect: both can be explained by mean reversion and/or different risk attitudes in
the gain and loss domains. It is possible that our task captures the same determinants underlying the disposition effect and1 The detailed construction of the ambiguous lottery is provided in Appendix A . We used an ambiguous instead of a risky lottery to bring our task closer 
to our experimental asset markets with ambiguous fundamental values. The choice for ambiguous fundamental values in the trading environment was 
taken to better resemble real stock investments in actual markets with unknown return distributions. 
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Table 1 
The outcomes of the ambiguous lottery in four rounds for each of the six basic tasks. 
Tasks Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
1 −400 400 400 400 
2 400 400 −400 400 
3 400 −400 400 400 
4 −400 400 −400 400 
5 (L) −400 −400 −400 −400 
6 (G) 400 400 400 400 
Notes: Task 5 (“Task L”) is used to measure subjects’ disposition effect levels in the loss domain, 
and task 6 (“Task G”) is used to measure subjects’ disposition effect levels in the gain domain. The 





































the gambler’s fallacy. As it will become clear soon, mean reversion is unlikely to apply in our setting as we limit our design
to one shock, and subjects know that there is no further signal. 
We separately measure the inclination of stopping when experiencing gains and continuing when experiencing losses.
To do so, we construct six basic tasks, as described above. Two tasks have a particular sequence of lottery outcomes. The
outcomes of the ambiguous lottery are four continuous gains in one basic task and four continuous losses in another, should
subjects play to the end. In light of the disposition effect, subjects with a high disposition effect level should stop playing
early in the four-gains series and proceed further in the four-losses series. By counting the number of lotteries that subjects
play in each of the above two tasks, we are able to separately measure the level of the disposition effect in the gain and
loss domains for each subject. The outcomes were more “normal” in the remaining four tasks. Table 1 shows the outcomes
of the ambiguous lottery across four rounds in the six tasks. The order of the six tasks was randomized on the individual
level. Subjects received an initial endowment of 1600 ECU, which is sufficient to cover any potential losses, and one of the
six tasks was randomly chosen for actual payment. 
Our task shares features with some of the previous measures, such as the hypothetical “housing task” used in Weber and
Welfens (2007a) and the “stock market task” in Weber, Welfens, 2007 . Our disposition effect measurement task differs from
those measures in two important ways. First, by having the two tasks of four-gains series and four-losses series, we are
able to measure the disposition effect in the gain and loss domains separately. We believe such a separation is important.
Weber and Welfens, 20 07a, 20 07b; Weber, Welfens find that both individual disposition effect and market underreaction are
asymmetric following an increasing versus a decreasing price trend. One potential reason could be that individuals exhibiting
high disposition effect levels in a bull market might not be the same ones who exhibit high disposition effect levels in a
bear market, and, consequently, this could result in different market dynamics, such as in prices or volumes. Furthermore, it
could be that the overall traders disposition effect levels are weaker in the loss domain than in the gain domain. Second, our
task is based on individual decisions rather than market tradings as, for example, the “stock market task” in Weber, Welfens,
2007 . Like the “housing task,” it gives some distance between the measure and the definition of the disposition effect. This
implies that it is more difficult for our measure to work as effectively as the market measure of the disposition effect:
our measure would not work unless it captures (at least one of the) actual working mechanisms behind the disposition
effect. Given that our measure method is based on a prospect value function, evidence of the effective measurement of
the disposition effect with our method supports the hypothesis that prospect theory is indeed an important source for the
disposition effect. 
2.2. Markets, the asset, and signals 
Markets : In each session of the experiment, there were 27 subjects who were assigned into three experimental asset
markets. Specifically, we composed each market with nine subjects according to their levels of the disposition effect. 2 The
experimental asset markets are similar to those in Plott and Sunder (1982) . Each subject received 40 0 0 ECU and 15 units of
an ambiguous asset at the start of the market. Trades over the asset took place in an open-book continuous double auction
for a trading round of four minutes in total. Short selling and leverage were not allowed. Buy orders could enter the book
only when subjects had enough money to pay for the asset, while sell orders were possible only when a seller had enough
assets to sell. Historical transaction prices were presented on the trading screen (see Fig. A.2 in appendix). 
To investigate the role of the disposition effect in market efficiency following private signals to some informed traders,
we divided each trading round into two trading phases. Subjects first traded the asset without private information for two
minutes. Trading then paused, and we provided three subjects – informed traders whose disposition effect levels were
either the highest or the lowest in the market – with a private signal. The non-informed traders were notified that the
informed traders had received the private signal (and thus knew that they were not selected as informed traders). Trading2 We ranked the disposition effect levels among all 27 subjects from the highest to the lowest. To achieve sufficient heterogeneity of the disposition effect 
levels among the subjects in each market, we apply the following rule of assignment: the i th market, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} was composed of subjects whose rank 
equaled i + 3 x, with x ranging from 0 to 8 in steps of one. We classified subjects that decided not to play any lottery in the disposition effect measurement 
task as a non-informed trader. This is because in these cases, the subjects could not be classified as either high or low disposition effect individuals. 
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Table 2 
The eight treatments. 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Domain where the disposition effect is measured Gain (Rounds 1 to 4) Loss (Rounds 5 to 8) 
Informed traders’ disposition effect levels High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Type of signal Pos. Neg. Neg. Pos. Neg. Pos. Pos. Neg. 
Notes: The experiment consisted out of 8 rounds. In the first (final) 4 rounds the informed traders’ disposition effect was measured in the gain (loss) 
domain. In the odd (even) rounds the three subjects with the highest (lowest) disposition effect levels were appointed as informed traders. Per round a 









































continued for two further minutes after the private signal was provided. The existence of informed traders and the structure
of signals were common knowledge, but subjects did not know who would be an informed trader when entering the first
trading phase of the market. A comparison of the trading dynamics between markets where informed traders have the
highest disposition effect levels and markets where informed traders have the lowest disposition effect levels allow us to
directly examine the influence of the disposition effect on the market efficiency. See Appendix A for more details about the
experimental asset markets. 
The ambiguous asset : The per unit, called “share” in the experiment, value of the ambiguous asset was determined by
the color of a randomly drawn ball from a bowl containing 100 balls with an unknown color composition. The per share
value of the ambiguous asset was 0 ECU for a black ball, 100 ECU for a white ball, 600 ECU for a yellow ball, and 700 ECU
for a purple ball. The “naive” fundamental value was thus 350 ECU if subjects consider all colors equally likely, and they
are ambiguity and risk neutral. We use the ambiguous asset instead of the risky asset to more closely resemble actual stock
markets. Subjects were told that before trades took place, a ball was drawn from the bowl independently for each market,
with the color of the drawn ball first hidden and announced after the market closed. 
Signals : As explained above, after the first trading phase and during the trading pause, the informed traders received a
private signal. The private signal excluded one potential color of the drawn ball. The positive signal excluded the white color
(eliminating the possibility of 100 ECU), and as a result, the naive expected value of the asset increased from 350 ECU to
433.33 ECU. Conversely, a negative signal excluded the yellow color (eliminating the possibility of 600 ECU), and the naive
expected value dropped from 350 ECU to 26 6.6 6 ECU. Note that after the signal, the worst state – the drawn ball is black –
and the best state – the drawn ball is purple – remain. Note also that the standard deviation of the assets expected value
(309.12) is equal following a positive or negative signal, while the skewness differs only in sign (0.65 and −0.65 following a
positive and negative signal, respectively). 
Matching signals with the measure of the disposition effect : We determined the informed traders once according to the
disposition effect measure in the gain domain and once according to the disposition effect measure in the loss domain. The
informed traders can receive a positive signal or a negative signal. In general, market prices rise following a positive signal,
and market prices decline following a negative signal. This allowed us to construct markets where the type (positive versus
negative) of the signal either matches or does not match the measurement domain (gain versus loss) of the disposition effect
according to which informed traders are determined. We say the domain matches the signal when the disposition effect is
measured in the gain domain and the signal is positive (thus the market is rising and traders are more likely making gains),
and when the disposition effect is measured in the loss domain and the signal is negative (thus the market is declining and
traders are more likely making losses). We say the domain does not match the signal otherwise. 
We chose this design because we wanted to examine whether the different domains in which the disposition effect is
measured affect market efficiency differently in rising markets versus in declining markets. If the disposition effect measured
in the gain domain is fundamentally different from that measured in the loss domain, only the disposition effect measured
in the gain domain should affect market efficiency in a rising market. Similarly, only the disposition effect measured in the
loss domain should affect market efficiency in a declining market. 
Treatments : To accommodate all possibilities mentioned above, we had a 2 × 2 × 2 design: 2 types of informed traders
(the highest/the lowest disposition effect levels) × 2 measures of the disposition effect (measured in gain/loss domain)
× 2 types of signals (positive/negative). Table 2 summarizes the eight treatments and the rounds in which each treatment
took place. 
2.3. Measuring ambiguity attitudes 
As subjects faced an ambiguous lottery in the measurement of the disposition effect levels and traded an ambiguous asset
in the experimental asset markets, we measured ambiguity attitudes in the final part of our experiment (see Appendix A for
instructions). Specifically, subjects were first asked to pick a color, either white or black. Then, subjects faced a choice list
with eleven rows. In each row, there was a risky and an ambiguous urn. The unknown composition of white and black
balls in the ambiguous urn remained constant across rows. The risky urn in each row contained a known composition of
white and black balls, but the proportion changed across rows (see Fig. A.3 in appendix for the list). Subjects were asked
to choose between the ambiguous and risky urn at each row. Subjects were told that one of the eleven rows would be
randomly selected for payment. A ball would be drawn from the chosen urn by the computer. The subject would receive
800 ECU should the drawn balls color match the color chosen by the subject. 
6 D.-J. Janssen, J. Li and J. Qiu et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 113 (2020) 103856 












We use the average of the two winning probabilities of the two risky urns at and below the switching row as the ”match-
ing probability.” A matching probability lower (higher) than 0.5 is interpreted as ambiguity aversion (or ambiguity seeking,
respectively). This method measures ambiguity attitudes independent of risk attitudes ( Wakker, 2010 ) and is frequently used
in the literature (e.g., Cavatorta and Schröder, 2019; Dimmock et al., 2015; Lauriola and Levin, 2001 ). 
2.4. General procedures 
We ran six experimental sessions with 27 subjects each (162 subjects in total) in the Individual Decision lab at Radboud
University, The Netherlands. All experiments were programmed using z-Tree ( Fischbacher, 2007 ), and subjects were recruited
using ORSEE ( Greiner, 2004 ). Each session lasted approximately 1 h and 30 mins. Subjects average earning was 17.01 euro.
Payments were paid out in cash at the end of each session. The experiment is depicted schematically in Fig. 1 . 
2.5. Hypotheses 
By combining the argumentation and prior literature presented in the introduction with the experimental design pre-
sented in this section, we are able to formulate the following three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. Informed traders with high disposition effect levels have a higher (lower) willingness to hold the asset fol-
lowing a negative (positive) signal than informed traders with low disposition effect levels. 
We measure the willingness to hold the asset with the numbers of (submitted and accepted) bids and asks, bid prices
and ask prices, and trading volumes. A higher (lower) willingness to hold the asset corresponds to submitting more (fewer)
bids and/or fewer (more) asks, quoting higher (lower) bid prices and/or higher (lower) ask prices, and holding more (fewer)
assets in the end. 











































The private signal is only in the hands of informed traders. For market prices to reflect the private signal, informed
traders must initiate trades, and only through their trading can the private signal be transmitted into market prices. In light
of the disposition effect, there are two possibilities that are not mutually exclusive. In the first possibility, market prices
are affected by the general disposition effect levels in a market. In our experiment, the general disposition effect levels
in different treatments are similar. This leaves us with the second possibility, which is also our main focus. In the second
possibility, market prices are directly affected by the disposition effect levels of the informed traders. Following a positive
(negative) signal, informed traders with high disposition effect levels are likely to submit asks (bids) with lower (higher)
prices, resulting in weaker buying (selling) forces. Weaker forces are then expected to slow down the process by which
market prices are adjusted to the new equilibrium level. This leads to our second hypothesis about market efficiency: 
Hypothesis 2. Following a signal, markets with informed traders with high disposition effect levels exhibit stronger price
underreaction than markets with informed traders with low disposition effect. 
However, as we explained in Section 2.2 , we only expect the above hypotheses to hold when informed traders disposition
effect levels are measured in a domain (gain/loss) that matches the sign of the private signal (positive/negative). This leads
to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold only when the informed traders’ disposition effect levels are measured
in the domain that matches the sign of the private signal. 
Hypothesis 3 is consistent with field data and a finding in Weber and Welfens (2007a) . They find that individual behavior
in the two domains is unrelated; there is no systematic correlation between the proportions of winners and losers realized
following a positive and negative signal. Results in support of Hypothesis 3 would suggest the importance of eliciting the
disposition effect in the loss and gain domains separately. 
3. Experimental results 
In the report of our experimental results, we proceed as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the individual disposition effect
levels that were separately measured in the gain and loss domains as well as their relationship with ambiguity attitudes.
We examine Hypothesis 1 and 2 in Section 3.2 by comparing trading behavior, market prices, and price underreaction in
markets with high and low disposition informed traders. Section 3.2 considers only markets in which the disposition effect
levels according to which the informed traders were selected were measured in a domain (gain/loss) that matches the sign
of the private signal (positive/negative). 
Hypothesis 3 is examined in Section 3.3 , in which we investigate the markets in which the informed traders disposition
effect levels were measured in a domain that is different from the sign of the private signal. Comparing trading behavior
in Section 3.3 with those in Section 3.2 allows us to check whether the disposition effect measured in the gain and loss
domains has different behavioral implications. 
All numbers reported below relating to trading quantities reflect the average per-person behavior of the nine-person
asset markets. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, a significant difference is over the whole post-signal period. 
3.1. Individual disposition effect levels 
As mentioned in Section 2.1 , we used the four-gains series to measure subjects disposition effect in the gain domain,
and the four-losses series to measure subjects disposition effect in the loss domain. Concretely, for each subject, we count
the number of lotteries that he/she played in the four-gains series and the four-losses series. This means that for both the
disposition effect measured in the loss and gain domain, each subject receives a level ranging from 0 to 4, with subjects
deciding not to play any lottery having a level of 0, while subjects deciding to play all four lotteries have a level of 4. Based
on the prospect value function, we posit that the later (or earlier) a subject quits at the four-losses series (the four-gains
series, respectively), the higher his/her disposition effect level in the loss (gain) domain is. For sake of comparability between
the measures in the gain and loss domains, we invert the scale for the four-gains series. Hence, a level of 4 indicates the
highest level of the disposition effect in both the loss and gain domains. This construction is consistent with the basic idea
of the disposition effect: holding a loser for as long as possible or selling a winner as soon as possible. 
Table D.11 shows the frequency distribution of the individual disposition effect levels measured in the lottery task. As
can be seen, the distribution of the disposition effect levels in the loss domain first degree stochastically dominates that in
the gain domain, suggesting a stronger disposition effect in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, we find a negative
but statistically insignificant correlation of -0.105 between individuals disposition effect levels in the gain and loss domains
(Spearman correlation test, p = 0.182). The lack of a positive correlation as well as the fact that the disposition effect seems
more pronounced in the loss domain suggest that the two measures capture fundamentally different information. Hence,
using one general measure for both domains might neglect these differences in information. For example, given our results
above, it could be that the disposition effect is stronger in bear markets than in bull markets, and that different investors are
driving the disposition effect in the two kinds of markets. In subsections below, we examine more concretely the behavioral
implications of the disposition effect in the two different domains. 
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Table 3 
Informed trader disposition effect levels. 
High disposition informed traders Low disposition informed traders Mann Whitney U test 
Gain domain 2.94 0.14 0.000 
Loss domain 4.00 2.24 0.000 
Notes: Disposition effect levels for informed traders are measured in both the gain and loss domains. The final column 
provides the p-values of a Mann Whitney U test for differences in disposition effect levels between high and low 
































In our experiment, we examine how private information given to informed traders of high disposition effect levels or
low disposition effect levels is translated into market prices. Informed traders of high (or low) disposition levels were the
three traders with the highest (lowest, respectively) disposition effect levels in a market. For this design to be effective, we
need to ensure that there is a sufficiently large difference in the disposition effect levels of informed traders of high and
low disposition effect levels. This is indeed the case in our experiment. As we can see from Table 3 , the mean disposition
effect levels of the high and low disposition informed traders in the gain and loss domains are economically and statistically
significantly different (2.94 versus 0.14 in the gain domain and 4.00 versus 2.24 in the loss domain; Mann Whitney U tests
p = 0.0 0 0 in both domains). 3 
The lottery used in the measurement of the disposition effect is ambiguous. One might suspect a connection between
subjects ambiguity attitudes and the disposition effect levels. We find no significant correlation between individual ambigu-
ity attitudes (as measured by the task discussed in Section 2.3 ) and disposition effect levels in the gain domain (Spearman
correlation coefficient = -0.048; p = 0.548) nor in the loss domain (Spearman correlation coefficient = 0.017; p = 0.835). 4 
3.2. Markets of high versus low disposition informed traders 
In this part, we consider markets where the sign of the signal matches the domain in which the disposition effect levels
of the informed traders are measured. Thus, we consider markets where the informed traders were determined based on
the disposition effect measured in the gain domain and received a positive signal, and markets where the informed traders
were determined based on the disposition effect measured in the loss domain and received a negative signal. We compare
performance in markets with informed traders of high versus low disposition effect levels. In the analysis, we start with
individual trading behavior, such as the numbers of (submitted or accepted) bids and asks, the (submitted or accepted) bid
and ask prices, and the actual prices at which subjects bought or sold. We then move on to aggregate data, such as market
prices and price underreactions. Please note that all p-values below are obtained using a Wilcoxon signed rank test unless
otherwise stated. 
3.2.1. The willingness to hold the asset after a signal 
The disposition effect dictates a weaker (stronger) willingness to hold the asset following a price increase (decrease, re-
spectively). After a positive signal, the average transaction price increases significantly (an average increase of 5.73%, p =
0.0 0 0), while after a negative signal, the average transaction price decreases significantly (an average decrease of 10.39%, p
= 0.011). 5 Hence, as suggested by Hypothesis 1, following a positive (negative) signal, we should expect high disposition in-
formed traders to have a weaker (stronger, respectively) willingness to hold the asset than low disposition informed traders.
Our first result presents the informed traders’ willingness to hold the asset. 
Observation 1. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, following a positive (negative) signal, the informed traders of high disposition
effect levels are less (more, respectively) willing to hold the asset than the informed traders of low disposition effect levels.
Support for Observation 1: There is no universally accepted measure to capture the willingness to hold the asset. We try
to capture it via multiple dimensions. We first consider directly the numbers of bids or asks. Intuitively, if an informed
trader is less willing to hold the asset, he/she should submit more asks and/or fewer bids, accept more bids and/or fewer
asks, and buy less and/or sell more. Similarly, if an informed trader is more willing to hold the asset, he/she should submit
more bids and/or fewer asks, accept more asks and/or fewer bids, and buy more and/or sell less. Table 4 summarizes this
information. 6 , 7 A positive (negative) percentage implies more (less) active behavior – buying or selling – by the high dispo-3 In our setting, the traditional Odean (1998) measure is not appropriate because the traders in our experiment received shares as an endowment rather 
than purchasing in the market as in Odean (1998). Specifically, for subjects who trade infrequently the measure is not reliable because of limited data 
points. The measure can be provided upon request. 
4 We excluded subjects with multiple switching points or those who picked either the risky or ambiguous urn in all instances (3% of cases) from this 
analysis. 
5 The price reactions to signals suggest that traders do not apply the Maxmin rule to evaluate the ambiguous assets ( Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 ). 
6 The Wilcoxon test in Table 4 is performed by calculating the amount of bids, asks etc for every second following the price signal for both the low and 
high disposition informed traders. These values are then matched and a Wilcoxon test is used to test for the significance of these differences. This means 
that a total of 120 (number of seconds following the signal) times 2 = 240 values are used for the Wilcoxon test. 
7 The data on the number of (submitted and accepted) bids and asks placed per second per market in different rounds both before and after the price 
signal, with the post-signal data separated in insider and outsider order placement, could be found in Tables D.1 and D.2 in appendix. The percentage 
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Table 4 
Percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high and low disposition levels. 
Type of signal The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of 
Bids Asks Accepted bids Accepted asks Bought Sold 
A positive signal −63 .43 ∗∗∗ 54 .33 ∗∗∗ 61 .11 −21 .77 −34 .08 ∗∗∗ 106 .00 ∗∗∗
A negative signal −3 .40 −1 .17 −27 .84 ∗ 94 .29 ∗∗ 36 .49 ∗∗ −28 .39 ∗∗


































sition informed traders. Second, we construct two comprehensive proxies. In the first comprehensive proxy, we compare the
change in the number of submitted asks and bids of the informed traders after receiving a signal. The measure is obtained
by subtracting the ratio of mean number of asks per second after and before receiving a signal from the ratio of mean
number of bids per second after and before receiving a signal. 8 This proxy, which we dub I submit 
B −A (with A standing for asks
and B standing for bids), increases when informed traders are more willing to hold the asset following a private signal. In
a similar fashion, in the second comprehensive proxy, we compare the change in the number of accepted asks and bids of
the informed traders after receiving a signal. We denote the second proxy by I 
accept 
B −A . 
9 
As we can see from the top half of Table 4 , following a positive signal, the informed traders of high disposition effect
levels on average have significantly lower numbers of submitted bids and higher numbers of submitted asks; they bought
less and sold more than the informed traders of low disposition effect levels ( p < 0.01 for all measures). High disposition
informed traders also accept more bids and fewer asks than the low disposition informed traders, although both differences
are statistically insignificant ( p > 0.10). According to I submit 
B −A , following a positive signal, the willingness to hold the asset
equals 11.40 for the markets of the high disposition informed traders, which is significantly lower than the value of 129.47
for the markets with the low disposition informed traders. The proxy I 
accept 
B −A gives the same result: I 
accept 
B −A equals 60.33 for
the high disposition informed traders and 112.38 for the low disposition informed traders. Thus, following a positive signal,
both proxies indicate a stronger willingness of the high disposition informed traders to sell the asset than that of the low
disposition informed traders. 
Following a negative signal, as we can see from the bottom half of Table 4 , the informed traders of high disposition effect
levels accept fewer bids but more asks, and generally buy more and sell less than the informed traders of low disposition
effect levels. The differences, with the exception of the number of submitted bids and asks, are statistically significant. 10
The proxies I submit 
B −A and I 
accept 
B −A confirm that the high disposition informed traders are more inclined to hold the asset. The
value of I submit 
B −A equals -85.92 for the informed traders of high disposition effect levels and -102.34 for the informed traders
of low disposition effect levels. The value of I 
accept 
B −A equals -28.19 for the informed traders of high disposition effect levels
and -80.72 for the informed traders of low disposition effect levels. Both proxies thus show a stronger willingness to hold
the asset for the high disposition informed traders than for the low disposition informed traders following a negative signal.
A further finding consistent with the disposition effect is the asymmetry of significance between submitted and accepted
bids and asks. The disposition effect predicts active selling following a positive signal and passive holding following a nega-
tive signal. Active selling implies initiating more trades, and passive holding implies that traders prefer to accept rather than
initiate trades. This is exactly what we observed. The difference in the willingness to sell the asset is significant only in the
active trading of submitted bids and asks, while the difference in the willingness to buy the asset is significant only in the
passive trading of accepted bids and asks. 
3.2.2. Share holdings 
Given that the high disposition informed traders have a weaker (stronger) willingness to hold the asset following a
positive (negative) signal than their low disposition counterparts, we would expect the high disposition informed traders to
hold fewer (more) shares following a positive (negative) signal. Our next observation discusses this. 
Observation 2. Following a positive (negative) signal, the informed traders of high disposition effect levels hold significantly
fewer(more, respectively) shares than informed traders of low disposition effect levels. 
Support for Observation 2: Fig. 2 depicts the post-signal share holdings for informed traders of high and low disposition
effect levels. The figure on the left is after a positive signal, and the figure on the right is after a negative signal. As we candifferences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in each 30-second post-signal trading period could 
be found in Table D.7 in appendix. 
8 Specifically, let m ( A ) ( m ( B )) denote the mean number of the informed trader asks (bids) per second after receiving the signal, m ( a ) ( m ( b )) denote the 
mean number of asks (bids) per second made by the same informed traders before receiving the signal, this measure be written as: m ( B )/ m ( b ) - m ( A )/ m ( a ). 
Using all pre-signal traders as the benchmark (instead of using only those traders who became informed traders in the second trading phase) leads to 
qualitatively similar results. 
9 The summary of the two proxies for the eight rounds could be found in Table D.5 in appendix. 
10 We do observe rather big differences within the post signal period when we focus on the different 30-second trading blocks found in Table 4 . Especially 
the percentage differences between the number of submitted bids and asks show a rather erratic pattern throughout the four post-shock trading blocks. 
The pattern is more stable for the differences in accepted bids and asks, although the 200% difference in terms of accepted asks between the high and low 
disposition informed traders is a bit of an outlier. Incidentally, it exactly mirrors the 200% difference between the number of accepted bids of high and 
low informed traders found in markets following a positive signal. 
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Fig. 2. Average post-signal share build-ups. 
Table 5 
Percentage differences in prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders. 
Type of signal The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in 
Bid price Ask price Accepted bid price Accepted ask price Buy price Sell price 
A positive signal −6 .12 −11 .86 ∗∗∗ −21 .13 ∗∗ 3.29 3 .57 ∗∗ −18 .88 ∗∗
A negative signal 10 .04 10 .91 ∗∗∗ 20 .35 ∗∗∗ 1.14 10 .12 ∗∗ 11 .06 ∗∗∗
Notes: This table shows the percentage differences in prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders. Wilcoxon rank-sum test for 





















see from the left figure, following a positive signal, the informed traders of high disposition effect levels show a consistently
slower increase in share holdings than that of low disposition informed traders, suggesting high disposition informed traders
stronger post-signal willingness to sell the asset. The right figure is almost the exact inverse of the left figure: following a
negative signal, informed traders of high disposition effect levels show a consistently slower decrease in share holding than
that of low disposition informed traders, suggesting a stronger willingness to hold the asset of the high disposition informed
traders than that of the low disposition informed traders. 
3.2.3. Trading prices 
So far, we have discussed the impact of the disposition effect on trading behavior. We now move on to trading prices. In
light of the disposition effect, following a positive signal, informed traders of high disposition effect levels are more ready to
sell the asset. In order to decrease their share holdings faster (or increase slower) than those of the low disposition informed
traders, the informed traders of high disposition effect levels should be more likely to sell at a lower price and less likely
to buy at a higher price. Similarly, following a negative signal, the informed traders of high disposition effect levels are
more willing to hold the asset than the informed traders of low disposition effect. To retain more of their share holdings (or
decrease more slowly), the informed traders of high disposition effect levels should be more likely to buy at a higher price
or less likely to sell at a lower price. The observation below suggests that this was exactly what our subjects did. 
Observation 3. Following a positive (negative) signal, the informed traders of high disposition effect levels ask significantly
lower (higher, respectively) prices, accept bids with lower (higher, respectively) prices, and eventually sell the asset at sig-
nificantly lower (higher, respectively) prices than the informed traders of low disposition effect levels. 
Support for Observation 3: Table 5 shows the percentage differences between the high and low disposition informed
traders in their submitted bid prices and ask prices, their accepted bid prices and ask prices, and the prices at which they
actually bought and sold. 11 
As we can see from Table 5 , following a positive signal, high disposition informed traders asked significantly lower prices
(-11.86%, p < . 01 ), accepted bids with significantly lower prices ( −21.13%, p < 0.05), and they eventually sold the asset at
significantly lower prices ( −18.88%, p < 0.05). In contrast, following a negative signal, the informed traders of high disposi-
tion effect levels asked significantly higher prices (10.91%, p < 0.05), accepted bids with significantly higher prices (20.35%,
p < 0.05), and they eventually sold the asset at significantly higher prices (11.06%, p < 0.05). 11 The data on the submitted and accepted bid and ask prices placed per second per market in different rounds both before and after the price signal, with 
the post-signal data separated in insider and outsider order placement, could be found in Tables D.3, D.4 and D.6 in appendix. The percentage differences 
in the trading prices between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in each 30-second post-signal trading period could be found in 
Table D.8 in appendix. 
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The disposition effect primarily predicts holding or selling behavior rather than buying behavior. Following a positive
signal, it predicts a stronger tendency to sell, while following a negative signal, it predicts a stronger tendency to hold.
Indeed, as we can see from Table 5 , consistent with the disposition effect, differences in the buying behavior is less clear. In
Table 5 , the measures pointing to buying behavior include the differences in submitted bid prices, their accepted ask prices,
and the prices that were actually bought. Following either signal, the differences are insignificant in terms of bid prices and
accepted ask prices. There is a significant difference with the bought prices ( p < 0.05), but following a positive signal, the
sign is on the wrong direction, and the economic magnitude (3.57%) is comparatively smaller than the differences in ask
prices, accepted bid prices, and selling prices. 
3.2.4. Market prices 
Finally, we move on to market prices. The following observation summarizes the main finding. 
Observation 4. On a market level, (a) there is a significant underreaction of market prices in all markets; (b) there is a
tendency that price underreaction in markets with high disposition informed traders is stronger than that of markets with
low disposition informed traders; (c) the tendency exists following both positive and negative signals, but the underreaction
is stronger and more consistent following a negative signal. 
Support for observation 4a: Fig. 3 presents the price paths and the respective price benchmarks corrected for the uncer-
tainty premium 12 in the respective markets. We observe a significant underreaction in all markets. Furthermore, in general,
there is no clear momentum of market prices toward the new fundamental level. So, it seems markets indeed need more
time to reflect private information than public information. Comparing markets of high and low disposition informed traders,12 Please note that as the uncertainty premium can (and does) differ between different trading rounds in our experiment, we cannot simply compare the 
raw price levels between rounds. Instead, we correct for this by adding the uncertainty premium calculated for a particular round to the post-signal (bid-, 
ask-, accepted bid-, accepted ask-, buy- and sell-) prices of that particular round. However, not correcting for differences in the uncertainty premium does 
not qualitatively change our results. Here the uncertainty premium equals 50 for markets of high disposition informed traders and 70 for markets of low 
disposition informed traders. 
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Table 6 
Underreaction in markets of informed traders. 
Type of signal Markets Post-signal trading block (30 s. each) 
1 2 3 4 ALL 
A Markets of high disposition informed traders 15 .90 ∗∗∗ 16 .65 ∗∗∗ 20 .76 ∗∗∗ 29 .93 ∗∗∗ 20 .27 ∗∗∗
positive Markets of low disposition informed traders 16 .53 ∗∗∗ 17 .71 ∗∗∗ 19 .50 ∗∗∗ 14 .99 ∗∗∗ 17 .79 ∗∗∗
signal Difference between the two markets −0 .63 −1 .06 1 .26 14 .94 ∗∗ 2 .48 
A Markets of high disposition informed traders 35 .17 ∗∗∗ 30 .62 ∗∗∗ 29 .34 ∗∗∗ 19 .06 ∗∗∗ 29 .09 ∗∗∗
negative Markets of low disposition informed traders 26 .54 ∗∗∗ 25 .42 ∗∗∗ 20 .80 ∗∗∗ 7 .27 ∗ 21 .09 ∗∗∗
signal Difference between the two markets 8 .63 ∗ 5 .20 8 .54 ∗∗ 11 .79 ∗ 8 .00 ∗∗∗
Notes: This table shows the underreaction (in percentages) in markets of high and low disposition informed traders and the differences between the two. 




































we observe a significant increase in the average transaction price (4.75%, p = 0 . 018 ) following the positive private signal in
markets with high disposition informed traders. In markets with low disposition informed traders, the average transaction
price increases as well, but the difference (4.47%) is insignificant ( p = 0 . 392 ). Following a negative signal we observe a signif-
icant decrease in the average transaction price in both markets with high disposition informed traders ( −9.43%, p = 0 . 0 0 0 )
as well as in markets with low disposition informed traders ( −11.19%, p = 0 . 0 0 0 ). 
Support for observation 4b: Hypothesis 1 and the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that, the high disposition informed
traders have a stronger willingness to sell the asset following a positive signal, and are less willing to sell the asset following
a negative signal. These trading behaviors might distort the market prices. To measure this distortion, we compute, following
each type of signal, the percentage differences between the average transaction price, T i , in the i th post-signal 30-second
trading block and the respective benchmark B . 13 
Table 6 presents the percentage amount of underreaction as compared to the market-specific benchmark in both markets
and the differences in underreaction between the two markets. Overall markets with the high disposition informed traders
underreact more strongly than markets with the low disposition informed traders (20.27% versus 17.79% following a positive
signal and 29.09% versus 21.09% following a negative signal). 
Support for Observation 4c: The underreaction is weak following a positive signal: the difference between the two mar-
kets is insignificant overall ( p > 0.10) and is significant only in the fourth trading block (29.93 versus 14.99, p < 0.05).
The underreaction is stronger and more consistent following a negative signal: the difference between the two markets is
significant overall ( p < 0.01) and is significant in three of the trading blocks. The last result is consistent with the finding
in Section 3.1 that the disposition effect is stronger in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This result is related to
loss aversion in prospect theory: Investors are particularly averse to selling losing stocks because realizing losses is painful
( Barberis and Xiong, 2009; 2012; Shefrin and Statman, 1985 ). 
The comparison of Observations 1 to 3 with Observation 4 reveals one discrepancy between individual trading behavior
and the aggregate market outcome. Despite strongly consistent trading behavior with the disposition effect at the individual
(informed traders) level, in the aggregate we observe only a weak tendency in market price underreaction. Price underreac-
tion in the market with the low disposition informed traders is comparable with the market consisting of the high disposi-
tion informed traders. This is because after a positive signal, the low disposition effect informed traders ask for a high price,
but the non-informed traders consisting of low to medium disposition effect are not willing to buy at this high price, and
therefore few transactions take place. Also, the low disposition informed traders do not have to bid at higher prices because
the non-informed, low to medium disposition effect traders are readily willing to accept these low bids. As a consequence,
the market prices after a positive signal did not increase. For more detail please see the analysis in Appendix B . Further-
more, although we have markets of high and low disposition informed insiders, the overall disposition effect levels are the
same across those markets. Thus, the differences in market prices are purely driven by the differences in the disposition
effect levels of informed traders. This is unlike Weber and Camerer (1998) and Weber and Welfens, 2007a, 2007b; Weber,
Welfens where markets consist of either all high disposition traders or all low disposition traders, and difference in market
price reaction is obtained by comparing the markets of high disposition traders with those of low disposition traders. This
potential explanation in line with the finding of other studies that markets with heterogeneous traders are robust to various
kinds of biases. 14 
3.3. When the sign of the signal mismatches the disposition effect measure 
We have thus far discussed markets where the sign of the signal matches the domain in which the informed traders
disposition effect levels are measured. We now move on to markets where the sign of the signal does not match the domain
in which the informed traders disposition effect levels are measured. Thus, we are considering markets where the informed13 Specifically, following a positive signal, underreaction in the trading block i is defined as ( B pos - T i )/ B pos , where B pos is the benchmark following a 
positive signal. Following a negative signal, underreaction in the trading block i is defined as ( T i - B neg )/ B neg , where B neg is the benchmark following a 
negative signal. 
14 For example, Füllbrunn et al. (2014) find that while individual traders are ambiguity averse, because of the heterogeneity of individual attitudes toward 
ambiguity, there is no ambiguity aversion on the aggregate market level. 














































traders are selected based on the disposition effect levels measured in the loss (gain) domain, but they receive a positive
(negative, respectively) signal. Those markets should deliver qualitatively the same results if the disposition effect measured
in the gain domain and in the loss domain capture qualitatively the same information. Significant differences in the results
of markets examined in this subsection and those of markets considered in Section 3.2 would, however, suggest that general
measures ignoring the domain where the disposition effect is measured are unlikely to predict accurately the behavior of
traders in bear and bull markets at the same time. 15 
Indeed, in general we find that when the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which the informed traders
disposition effect levels are measured, results are qualitatively different from Observations 1 to 4. The results are summa-
rized in the following observation. Detailed evidence of the observation can be found in Appendix C . 
Observation 5. When the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which the informed traders disposition effect
levels are measured, there are no consistent differences between the informed traders of high and low disposition effect
levels in (a) the willingness to hold the asset, (b) the share holding, (c) the trading prices, and (d) underreaction of market
prices. 
Specifically, unlike results in Section 3.2 , the high disposition informed traders accept significantly fewer (more) bids and
sell significantly less (more) than the low disposition informed traders following a positive (negative) signal. The significant
difference in share holdings found in Fig. 2 between the high and low disposition informed traders vanishes in the mis-
matched markets (see in Fig. C.1 ). Furthermore, in contrast to Observation 3, there are no consistent differences of trading
prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders, with some measures pointing to the wrong direction.
Finally, the underreaction following a positive signal is stronger in markets with the low disposition informed traders than
those with the high disposition informed traders, and not significant following a negative signal. 
The above results suggest that the disposition effect measure predicts behavior well only when the market price devel-
opment matches the domain in which the disposition effect is measured. We conclude that the disposition effect measured
in the gain domain and in the loss domain are not two sides of the same coin, and a separate elicitation of the disposition
effect in the gain and loss domain is necessary. General measures, such as the one in Weber and Welfens (2007a) , might
not predict behavior well in bear and bull markets at the same time. 
4. Conclusion 
We have experimentally examined the role of the disposition effect in market underreaction following the arrival of
private information to a small group of informed traders. We measured individual disposition effect levels in both the gain
and loss domain via a novel method. Subjects then traded an ambiguous asset via a computer-based double auction. During
the trading, a (positive/negative) signal was given to some selected informed traders. The informed traders were either of
high or low disposition effect levels, which were measured either in the gain domain or in the loss domain. This translates
into a 2 × 2 × 2 design: two levels (high/low) of the informed traders disposition effect levels × two domains (gain/loss)
in which the disposition effect levels are measured × two types (positive/negative) of private signals. 
We find, first, that the disposition effect measured in the gain domain is unrelated to that measured in the loss do-
main. Second, compared to the informed traders of low disposition effect levels, following a positive (negative) signal, the
informed traders of high disposition effect levels: (a) are less (more, respectively) willing to hold the asset, (b) hold signifi-
cantly fewer (more, respectively) stocks, and (c) ask significantly lower (higher, respectively) prices, accept bids with lower
(higher, respectively) prices, and eventually sell the asset at significantly lower (higher, respectively) prices. Third, although
we find individual behavior to be in line with informed traders disposition effect levels, this only weakly translates to dif-
ferences in terms of price underreaction between markets of high and low disposition informed traders. Specifically, there
is a tendency that price underreaction in markets with high disposition informed traders is stronger than that of markets
with low disposition informed traders. The tendency exists following both signals, but the underreaction is more consistent
following a negative signal. Finally, we find that results crucially depend on whether the sign of the signal matches the
domain in which the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. When the two do not match, a) there
are no consistent differences between the informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the willingness to
hold the asset, the share holding, and the trading prices, and b) there are no consistent differences between the informed
traders of high and low disposition effect levels in underreaction. 
Our results have important policy implications. Consistent with previous research on the disposition effect, our paper
provides further support to the influence of the disposition effect on market efficiency. This result suggests that introducing
measures to protect investors from the disposition effect, such as more active usage of the automatic “stop loss” orders
( Fischbacher et al., 2017 ), not only benefits individual investors but also the market as a whole. Banks providing investment
advice to their customers could also benefit from our findings. There are two sides of the disposition effect and the impacts
of the disposition effect on market prices are asymmetrical. These findings suggest that different populations of investors15 In reality when financial markets are in a bear market, a single positive shock does mean traders are making profits. Quite the opposite, most of them 
may experience losses and perceive themselves in the loss domain. This is different in our experiment. In our experimental design markets were initially 
in a neutral position. There were no positive nor negative signals. We then controlled the market trend through releasing a positive or negative signal. 
Intuitive and confirmed in experimental results, markets rise following a positive signal and decline following a negative signal. Therefore, the market 
trend and the sign of signal types were always in the same direction. 
































suffer from the disposition effect in bear markets and in bull markets. It is therefore important for banks to tailor the
investment advice not only to different types of investors but also to different market conditions. 
To conclude, we thus observe both the individual behavior and the aggregate market behavior to be generally in line
with Hypotheses 1 and 2. The relatively weak evidence for Hypothesis 2, however, suggests that the strong impact of the
disposition effect bias on individual behavior does not work through as strongly into aggregate market prices. Note that price
formation is the result of many dynamic interactions, including, for example, the trading strategies of informed traders and
outsiders, the capital constraints, the asset positions, and the learning of outsiders. The disposition effect is, of course, just
one of the forces at play. Thus, the finding that there is stronger support for Hypothesis 1 than for Hypothesis 2 might
not be too surprising after all. Finally, the clearly supportive evidence in line with Hypothesis 3 stresses the importance of
distinguishing the disposition effect in the gain and loss domain. This might be of particular interest for future research. 
Appendix A. Experimental instructions 
Welcome 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. By showing up on time you receive a s show-up fee of 4 Euro. The
purpose of this experiment is to understand how people behave in certain situations. There are no right or wrong answers.
Please make the choice that you feel most comfortable with. Your identity will never be revealed; others will not be able to
identify you with the choices you made. 
In the experiment you will be able to make some money. The amount of money you can make depends on your choices
and some luck. The money you earn will be immediately paid out to you in private after the experiment. 
If you have any question during the experiment, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to you and answer
your questions individually. Please put your cell phone on airplane mode and do not talk with other participants in the
experiment; otherwise, we may be forced to exclude you from the experimental payment. 
The experiment consists of three parts. Detailed instruction for each part is provided below and also shown on the
computer screen before that part starts. In the experiment we talk about Experimental Currency Units (ECU) instead of
Euro. 
The exchange rate between ECU and euro is 10 0 0 ECU = 1 Euro 
Measuring individual disposition levels 
You face six rounds in this part of the experiment. In each round you face a lottery. There is a computerized bag with
10 balls, which are either black or white but are of unknown proportion. The bag remains unchanged in each round. The
lottery is such that you gain 400 ECU (+400 ECU) if the drawn ball is white and lose 400 ECU (- 400 ECU) if the drawn ball
is black. Here the ball is drawn with replacement. You need to decide whether you want to play the lottery. 
If you decide not to play the lottery, the round ends and the next round begins. If you decide to play the lottery, the
payment of the lottery will be immediately determined by the computer and given to you. In each round you can play the
lottery sequentially up to four times. 
At the end of the experiment, one of the six rounds will be randomly chosen by the computer to determine your payment
in part 1. Your earning in part thus equals the payments from the lottery of the randomly chosen round. 
Market stage 
Instructions for subjects: In this part of the experiment, you are one of the nine traders in a stock market. There are
8 trading rounds. Each trading round lasts 5 minutes. You trade a stock, and trading relates to units of the stock (“share”
hereafter). One share is one unit of the stock. 
The value of each share is determined as follows. There is a box with 100 balls of four colors: black, white, yellow and
purple, but you don’ t know the proportions of these colored balls. The proportions of the colored balls are changed in
each round. At the beginning of each trading round, a ball will be drawn randomly from the box, and the color of the
ball determines the value of each share. The color of the ball will be revealed at the end of the trading round. Black ball
corresponds to 0 ECU for each share, white ball corresponds to 100 ECU for each share, yellow ball corresponds to 600 ECU
for each share, and purple ball corresponds to 700 ECU for each share. That is: 
The Box 
The color of the drawn Ball Black White Yellow Purple 
Value of each share 0 ECU 100 ECU 600 ECU 700 ECU 
At the beginning of each round, you receive an initial endowment. You then have 2 minutes to trade with other partic-
ipants in the stock market. For detailed instruction on trading screen and trading rules please see the trading instruction
sheet that have been provided to you. After 2 minutes trading pauses, and three of the nine traders receive a private signal.
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Fig. A.1. Lottery task. 
Fig. A.2. Trading screen. 
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The private signal excludes one potential color of the drawn ball. For example, the signal could state that the drawn ball is
NOT white. Then trading continues for another two minutes. 
Prior to the first trading round there will be ONE TRIAL ROUND in which you can familiarize yourself with the trading
screen and trading rules. Your decisions in the trial round will NOT affect your payoff. At the end of part 2 one trading
round will be randomly chosen. Your payment in the chosen round will be your payoff in part 2. Your payment in a trading
round = the number of shares in your portfolio at end of the round. 
In part 2 of the experiment, buying and selling shares in the stock market will be processed by the computer. During
each trading round, you will see the following trading screen. 
How to buy a share: If you want to buy a share, you can do so in two ways: 
1. When there are sell orders in the “Selling Orders” column that you want to buy, you can directly click on the listed
order price at which you want to buy and press the “Buy” button, and the share will be immediately bought. 
2. You can enter a price that you are willing to pay in the field above the red button of “submit BUY order”, and click
the red button (“submit BUY order”). Your buy order will then be displayed in the “Buying Orders” column. Your order will
be only executed when other traders want to sell the share at your buying price. 
How to sell a share: If you want to sell a share, you also have two ways to do this: 
1. When there are buy orders in the “Buying Orders” column that you want to sell, you can directly click on the listed
order price at which you want to sell and press the “Sell” button, and then the share will be immediately sold. 
2. You can enter a price that you are willing to sell in the field above the red button of “submit SELL order”, and click
the red button(“submit SELL order”). Your sell order will then be displayed in the ”Selling Orders” column. Your order will
be only executed when other traders want to buy the share at your selling price. 
Measuring ambiguity attitudes (shown on screen) 
Screen 1 
In this part, we present you a decision table with 11 situations. Each situation offers you a choice between drawing a
ball from two different urns, urn 1 or urn 2. Both urns contain 10 balls, either black or white. 
As explained before, both urns contain 10 balls, either white or black: 
Urn 1: The composition of urn 1 changes from one situation to the next. While the number of balls in one color (e.g.,
white) increases from 0 to 10, the number of balls of the other color (e.g., black) decreases accordingly. 











Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. However, you don not know how many balls are white
and how many balls are black. Any combination is possible. There might be anywhere from 0 to 10 white balls, with the
remaining balls being black. 
One ball will be drawn from the urn you choose. The payment you can earn depends on the color of the ball drawn.
Only one color yields payment. You can choose whether the color that yields payment is white or black. Please choose the
color of the ball that provides you payment: 




Please take a look at the table below. In each of the 11 situations we would like you to indicate which urn (urn 1 or urn
2) you prefer drawing a ball from. At the end of this part, the computer will randomly select one out of the 11 situations.
Then, depending on whether you have chose urn 1 or urn 2 in that situation, the computer will randomly draw one ball
from that urn. Depending on the color of the ball, you earn the payment indicated in the table. Both urns contain 10 balls,
either white or black. 
As explained before, both urns contain 10 balls, either white or black: 
Urn 1: The composition changes from one situation to the next 
Urn 2: The composition of urn 2 is identical in each situation. 
However, you do not know how many balls are white and how many balls are black. Any combination is possible. 
Please note that the color of the ball you have chosen for payment is: [insert color] 
Now please choose in each situation, from which urn you prefer to draw a ball, urn 1 or urn 2 ? 
Appendix B. Additional information relating to observation 4 
Another potential reason for the inconsistency between individual trading and aggregate market prices might be related
to a mismatch in what the informed traders would like to achieve with their trades and what the non-informed tradersFig. B.1. Asks made by informed traders vs. asks accepted by non-informed traders. 
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are willing to offer them. This mismatch is especially interesting in two cases; firstly, in the case of a positive price signal
given to low disposition insiders and secondly in the case of a negative signal given to low disposition insiders. In both
these cases the market price would be expected to respond to the signal relatively strongly compared to the case when the
signals would be given to the high disposition insiders as low disposition insiders do not have the tendency to suppress
the signal by contrarian trading behavior the way high disposition informed traders would (i.e. selling after a positive signal
and holding the asset following a negative shock). 
To further study these two cases, we compare the asks/bids made by informed traders (red line) with asks/bids accepted
by non-informed traders (blue line) for the different disposition traders/signal combinations in Fig. B.1 and Fig. B.2 . The first
case of interest (Low disposition - Positive signal) relates to the top right panel in both figures. What is clear from this
panel in Fig. 2 is that the asks made by insiders are rather high. However, on average these asks were not accepted by
non-informed traders. 
In the top left panel of Fig. B.1 (High disposition-Positive signal), we observe rather high asks in the starting period as
well but here the informed traders lower their asks over time towards what the non-informed traders are willing to pay
whereas this does not happen to the same extent for the low disposition informed traders. In Fig. B.2 , we do not see a
large mismatch in the two top panels when it comes to bids made and accepted by informed and non-informed traders
respectively. However, the bid price is relatively low meaning that these bids do not move the transaction price up. It thus
seems that only through asks the signal could come through. However, the informed traders in this market make 2.85 more
bids than asks thereby reducing the relative impact of the asks that carry more information concerning the new fundamental
value. 
The second interesting case is that of the market with low disposition insiders following a negative shock (Low
disposition-Negative signal), which relates to the bottom right panel in both Figs. B.1 and B.2 . As was the case with the
top right panel, here too one would expect a strong reaction in market prices following the (in this case) negative signal as
there is more selling pressure than in the market with high disposition informed traders following a negative price signal
(see Table 4 ). However, the bottom right panel of Fig. B.2 (Low disposition-Negative signal) shows that the bid prices of
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Fig. C.1. Average post-signal share build-ups (mismatched). 
Table C.1 




The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of 
Bids Asks Accepted bids Accepted asks Bought Sold 
A positive signal −24 .51 ∗∗∗ 43 .86 ∗∗ −49 .12 ∗∗∗ 12 .12 −9 .69 −27 .62 ∗∗
A negative signal −32 .65 ∗∗ −33 .63 ∗∗∗ 48 .64 ∗∗ 0 .00 −5 .75 −10 .91 
Notes: This table shows the percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the markets 
where the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. Wilcoxon rank-sum 





















low disposition informed traders are much lower on average than what the non-informed traders are willing to sell for.
Due to this mismatch, prices will not go down to the level to which the informed traders would like to see it go down,
thereby explaining the rather small change in prices in this market (although larger in absolute terms than the change in
market prices following a positive shock). Moving to the corresponding panel of Fig. B.1 (Low disposition-Negative signal),
we observe a much smaller mismatch but the asks that are met by the non-informed traders are at relatively high prices,
meaning that the average transaction price does not decrease by much. Moreover, and analogous to the case of the “Low
disposition-Positive signal” market, the amount of relatively low-priced bids is 2.9 times lower than the amount of relatively
high-priced asks placed. This thus means that the negative price signal as captured by the low bids is overshadowed by the
higher priced as well as more numerous asks. 
Summarizing, for the “Low disposition-Positive signal” market, we see that the information rich asks are on average not
accepted and overshadowed by the more numerous and lower priced bids. For the “Low disposition-Negative signal” market,
we see that the information rich bids are on average not accepted and overshadowed by the more numerous and higher
priced asks. 
The large difference between bids and asks and the accepted bids and asks when these bids and asks are informative of
the price signal coupled with the higher frequency of non-informative bids/asks might thus potentially explain why in the
above to mentioned cases of interest there exists an inconsistency between individual trading and aggregate market prices. 
Appendix C. Supporting evidence for Observation 5 
Support for Observation 5a): Following a positive signal, as we can see from Table C.1 , unlike markets in Section 3.2 ,
the high disposition informed traders accept significantly fewer bids and sell significantly less than the low disposition in-
formed traders. 16 Moreover, the high disposition informed traders accept more bids and buy more than the low disposition
informed traders, although in both cases, the difference is not significant. Further differences can be found when we con-
sider the proxies I sumbit 
B −A and I 
accept 
B −A . In Section 3.2 , both proxies I 
sumbit 
B −A and I 
accept 
B −A suggest a stronger willingness to sell the
asset for the high disposition informed traders than for the low disposition informed traders. This is not the case with the
markets we consider here. While we do find a stronger willingness of the high disposition informed traders to sell the16 See Table D.9 in the appendix for the percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels 
in each 30-second post-signal trading period when the sign of the signal does not match the domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed 
traders are measured. 
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The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in 
Bid price Ask price Accepted bid price Accepted ask price Buy price Sell price 
A positive signal −16 .16 ∗∗∗ 6 .82 19 .21 ∗∗ 4 .32 5 .83 ∗∗ 12 .17 ∗
A negative signal 4 .14 −4 .20 3 .99 20 .11 ∗∗∗ 13 .19 ∗∗ −2 .04 
Notes: This table shows the percentage differences of prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders in the markets where the sign 
of the signal does not match the domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. Wilcoxon test for significance (final row 
only): ∗∗∗ stands for p < 0.01, ∗∗ stands for p < 0.05, ∗ stands for p < 0.1. 
Table C.3 





Post-signal trading block (30 s. each) 
1 2 3 4 ALL 
A Markets of high disposition informed traders 13 .06 ∗∗∗ 18 .97 ∗∗∗ 16 .83 ∗∗∗ 15 .07 ∗∗∗ 16 .14 ∗∗∗
positive Markets of low disposition informed traders 23 .88 ∗∗∗ 22 .31 ∗∗∗ 20 .51 ∗∗∗ 23 .42 ∗∗∗ 22 .22 ∗∗∗
signal Difference between the two markets −10 .82 ∗∗ −3 .34 −3 .68 −8 .35 ∗∗ −6 .08 ∗∗∗
A Markets of high disposition informed traders 29 .65 ∗∗∗ 25 .82 ∗∗∗ 19 .14 ∗∗∗ 22 .10 ∗∗∗ 23 .52 ∗∗∗
negative Markets of low disposition informed traders 34 .37 ∗∗∗ 30 .09 ∗∗∗ 11 .25 ∗∗∗ 2 .62 20 .76 ∗∗∗
signal Difference between the two markets −4 .72 −4 .27 ∗∗ 7 .89 19 .48 ∗∗ 2 .76 
Notes: This table shows the underreaction (in percentages) in markets of high and low disposition informed traders and the differences between the two 
in the markets where the sign of the signal does not match the domain in which the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. Mann 





















asset following a positive signal than that of the low disposition informed traders when looking at I sumbit 
B −A , the opposite is
observed when we use I 
accept 
B −A . Specifically, we find I 
sumbit 
B −A to equal 47.87 for the high disposition informed traders and 151.18 
for the low disposition informed traders, while I sumbit 
B −A and I 
accept 
B −A equal 105.00 and 17.33, respectively, for the high and the
low disposition informed traders. In contrast to markets in Section 3.2 , the latter proxy thus does not provide clear evidence
of a higher positive change in the willingness to hold shares between the low disposition informed traders and the high
disposition informed traders following a positive private signal. 
Following a negative signal, a comparison of Tables C.1 and 4 reveals that the large and significant positive differences
in the number of accepted asks between the high and low disposition informed traders in the market of Section 3.2 has
disappeared in the markets considered here. Moreover, unlike the markets examined in Section 3.2 , in the current markets,
the high disposition informed traders actually accept significantly more bids than the low disposition informed traders.
When we consider the proxies I sumbit 
B −A and I 
accept 
B −A , similarly, we observe an inconsistency. The proxy I 
sumbit 
B −A gives a similar
result as in the market of Section 3.2 : I sumbit 
B −A equals −74.25 for the high disposition informed traders and −161.7 for the
low disposition informed traders. For I 
accept 
B −A , however, we find the opposite: I 
accept 
B −A equals −24.82 for the high disposition
informed traders and equals −6.10 for the low disposition informed traders. 
Support for Observation 5b): The comparison of Fig. C.1 and Fig. 2 reveals a clear difference. While the markets of
Section 3.2 show a clear difference between the high and low disposition informed traders in post-signal changes in share
holdings, no such differences are visible in Fig. C.1 . 
Support for Observation 5c): Comparing Table 5 with Table C.2 shows that, while the vast majority of differences in the
markets of Section 3.2 are in line with Hypothesis 1, the differences in the markets considered in this subsection are rather
inconsistent. 17 Some measures even point to the wrong directions. For example, following a positive signal, all measures,
with the exception of the difference in submitted bids, are positive, and following a negative signal, both the differences in
the price of submitted asks and the price at which the informed traders sell their assets are negative. 
Support for Observation 5d: Table C.3 shows the underreaction as well as the differences in underreaction between mar-
kets of the high and low disposition informed traders. Unlike the markets discussed in Section 3.2 , following a positive sig-
nal, the underreaction is overall significantly higher in markets with the low disposition informed traders than those with
the high disposition informed traders, while following a negative signal, there is no significant difference in underreaction. 
Appendix D. Additional tables 17 See Table D.10 in the appendix for the percentage differences of prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders in each 30- 
second post-signal trading period when the sign of the signal does not match the domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are 
measured. 
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Table D.1 




After shock Before 
shock 
After shock 
All Insiders Outsiders All Insiders Outsiders 
R1 0–30 0.249 0.174 0.249 0.138 0.372 0.273 0.201 0.312 
31–60 0.258 0.135 0.189 0.111 0.420 0.366 0.384 0.357 
61–90 0.186 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.327 0.300 0.261 0.318 
91–120 0.129 0.117 0.114 0.120 0.288 0.294 0.228 0.330 
ALL 0.207 0.150 0.180 0.135 0.351 0.309 0.270 0.330 
R2 0–30 0.345 0.135 0.123 0.141 0.414 0.555 0.906 0.378 
31–60 0.231 0.168 0.111 0.198 0.417 0.570 0.816 0.444 
61–90 0.219 0.123 0.144 0.114 0.366 0.480 0.657 0.393 
91–120 0.177 0.138 0.156 0.129 0.387 0.435 0.667 0.318 
ALL 0.243 0.141 0.135 0.147 0.396 0.510 0.762 0.384 
R3 0–30 0.402 0.195 0.105 0.243 0.492 0.462 0.618 0.387 
31–60 0.231 0.192 0.105 0.234 0.489 0.450 0.432 0.459 
61–90 0.207 0.186 0.084 0.237 0.477 0.513 0.549 0.495 
91–120 0.192 0.189 0.069 0.249 0.387 0.372 0.423 0.345 
ALL 0.258 0.192 0.090 0.240 0.462 0.450 0.507 0.423 
R4 0–30 0.408 0.339 0.618 0.201 0.591 0.393 0.210 0.483 
31–60 0.270 0.288 0.507 0.180 0.381 0.414 0.171 0.534 
61–90 0.264 0.249 0.462 0.141 0.390 0.417 0.207 0.522 
91–120 0.210 0.213 0.396 0.120 0.318 0.291 0.108 0.384 
ALL 0.288 0.273 0.495 0.162 0.420 0.378 0.174 0.480 
R5 0–30 0.387 0.258 0.240 0.267 0.564 0.522 0.906 0.330 
31–60 0.342 0.267 0.207 0.297 0.447 0.510 0.567 0.480 
61–90 0.288 0.228 0.168 0.258 0.336 0.381 0.507 0.318 
91–120 0.288 0.198 0.168 0.213 0.231 0.315 0.339 0.303 
ALL 0.327 0.237 0.195 0.258 0.396 0.432 0.579 0.357 
R6 0–30 0.411 0.435 0.678 0.315 0.531 0.342 0.216 0.405 
31–60 0.258 0.360 0.594 0.243 0.384 0.297 0.168 0.360 
61–90 0.303 0.381 0.606 0.270 0.351 0.234 0.138 0.282 
91–120 0.186 0.306 0.366 0.279 0.288 0.189 0.099 0.231 
ALL 0.291 0.372 0.561 0.276 0.390 0.267 0.156 0.321 
R7 0–30 0.486 0.423 0.639 0.318 0.540 0.420 0.399 0.429 
31–60 0.474 0.264 0.339 0.225 0.393 0.279 0.189 0.321 
61–90 0.339 0.303 0.315 0.294 0.300 0.234 0.138 0.282 
91–120 0.198 0.357 0.390 0.342 0.153 0.207 0.171 0.225 
ALL 0.375 0.336 0.420 0.294 0.348 0.285 0.225 0.315 
R8 0–30 0.447 0.339 0.183 0.417 0.531 0.561 0.723 0.480 
31–60 0.381 0.381 0.243 0.450 0.369 0.483 0.621 0.414 
61–90 0.321 0.216 0.150 0.249 0.294 0.414 0.579 0.333 
91–120 0.270 0.216 0.225 0.216 0.264 0.330 0.417 0.285 
ALL 0.354 0.288 0.201 0.333 0.366 0.447 0.585 0.378 
Notes: Average number of submitted bids and submitted asks per second per round grouped over all pre- and post-shock traders with the latter group 
subdivided into informed trader and outsider traders. For sake of comparability all figures have been normalized to a nine-person market. 
Table D.2 
Number of accepted bids and asks per second. 
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades 
Before shock After shock Before shock After shock Before shock After shock 
All Insider Outsider All Insider Outsider 
R1 0–30 0.081 0.048 0.051 0.048 0.129 0.078 0.156 0.039 0.210 0.126 
31–60 0.108 0.057 0.027 0.072 0.147 0.108 0.150 0.087 0.255 0.165 
61–90 0.090 0.048 0.033 0.057 0.117 0.111 0.093 0.123 0.207 0.159 
91–120 0.042 0.039 0.048 0.033 0.087 0.123 0.129 0.120 0.129 0.162 
ALL 0.081 0.048 0.039 0.054 0.120 0.105 0.132 0.093 0.201 0.153 
R2 0–30 0.072 0.033 0.039 0.03 0.123 0.123 0.039 0.168 0.195 0.156 
31–60 0.072 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.129 0.141 0.078 0.171 0.201 0.204 
61–90 0.063 0.045 0.039 0.051 0.162 0.138 0.132 0.141 0.225 0.183 
91–120 0.069 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.114 0.105 0.099 0.108 0.183 0.147 
ALL 0.069 0.045 0.051 0.045 0.132 0.126 0.087 0.147 0.201 0.174 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table D.2 ( continued ) 
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades 
Before shock After shock Before shock After shock Before shock After shock 
All Insider Outsider All Insider Outsider 
R3 0–30 0.120 0.042 0.072 0.024 0.108 0.081 0.057 0.093 0.228 0.123 
31–60 0.075 0.057 0.084 0.045 0.144 0.099 0.078 0.111 0.219 0.156 
61–90 0.072 0.063 0.084 0.054 0.162 0.117 0.123 0.114 0.234 0.180 
91–120 0.057 0.048 0.063 0.042 0.114 0.087 0.093 0.084 0.171 0.135 
ALL 0.081 0.054 0.075 0.042 0.132 0.096 0.087 0.102 0.213 0.150 
R4 0–30 0.078 0.057 0.015 0.078 0.126 0.069 0.129 0.039 0.204 0.126 
31–60 0.099 0.099 0.018 0.138 0.129 0.114 0.201 0.069 0.228 0.213 
61–90 0.093 0.090 0.012 0.129 0.117 0.135 0.183 0.111 0.210 0.225 
91–120 0.081 0.084 0.051 0.099 0.111 0.105 0.168 0.072 0.192 0.189 
ALL 0.087 0.084 0.024 0.111 0.120 0.105 0.171 0.072 0.210 0.189 
R5 0–30 0.087 0.057 0.078 0.048 0.159 0.072 0.033 0.093 0.246 0.129 
31–60 0.123 0.090 0.099 0.084 0.120 0.114 0.099 0.123 0.243 0.204 
61–90 0.093 0.081 0.105 0.069 0.123 0.120 0.123 0.120 0.216 0.201 
91–120 0.060 0.072 0.099 0.060 0.084 0.099 0.114 0.090 0.144 0.171 
ALL 0.090 0.075 0.096 0.066 0.123 0.102 0.093 0.108 0.213 0.177 
R6 0–30 0.066 0.075 0.066 0.081 0.135 0.093 0.111 0.084 0.201 0.168 
31–60 0.087 0.084 0.093 0.081 0.096 0.105 0.177 0.066 0.183 0.189 
61–90 0.078 0.084 0.078 0.090 0.102 0.093 0.132 0.072 0.180 0.177 
91–120 0.060 0.069 0.072 0.066 0.096 0.081 0.120 0.063 0.156 0.150 
ALL 0.072 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.108 0.093 0.135 0.072 0.180 0.171 
R7 0–30 0.087 0.063 0.027 0.081 0.114 0.105 0.168 0.072 0.201 0.168 
31–60 0.138 0.054 0.027 0.066 0.120 0.111 0.150 0.093 0.258 0.165 
61–90 0.057 0.054 0.027 0.066 0.108 0.105 0.162 0.075 0.165 0.159 
91–120 0.051 0.075 0.072 0.075 0.054 0.090 0.129 0.069 0.105 0.165 
ALL 0.084 0.063 0.039 0.072 0.099 0.102 0.153 0.078 0.183 0.165 
R8 0–30 0.093 0.051 0.105 0.024 0.105 0.108 0.012 0.156 0.198 0.159 
31–60 0.117 0.084 0.177 0.039 0.099 0.135 0.060 0.171 0.216 0.219 
61–90 0.114 0.072 0.117 0.051 0.099 0.114 0.057 0.144 0.213 0.186 
91–120 0.087 0.075 0.129 0.048 0.090 0.108 0.063 0.132 0.177 0.183 
ALL 0.102 0.072 0.132 0.042 0.099 0.117 0.048 0.150 0.201 0.186 
Notes: Average number of accepted bids, accepted asks and transactions per second per round grouped over all pre- and post-shock traders with the latter 
group subdivided into informed trader and outsider traders. For sake of comparability all figures have been normalized to a nine-person market. 
Table D.3 
Bid and ask prices. 
Bid Ask 
Before shock After shock Before shock After shock 
All Insider Outsider All Insider Outsider 
R1 0–30 235.46 271.78 298.93 243.98 375.29 394.57 352.94 407.95 
31–60 215.81 280.38 290.94 270.15 393.52 395.38 353.99 417.52 
61–90 259.92 265.48 288.30 253.13 357.31 361.25 328.88 374.29 
91–120 254.30 288.29 342.86 270.10 359.53 332.47 286.38 346.84 
ALL 238.23 273.37 296.31 256.61 373.22 373.33 335.92 388.35 
R2 0–30 227.61 234.24 190.33 247.74 374.29 335.00 336.36 333.35 
31–60 250.60 252.40 241.00 254.40 353.04 328.20 315.76 339.63 
61–90 277.61 207.50 171.18 221.86 339.83 294.02 293.16 294.80 
91–120 276.65 191.21 168.75 199.76 342.33 259.28 255.98 262.74 
ALL 252.05 226.34 190.51 236.86 353.16 309.29 306.12 312.49 
R3 0–30 260.77 241.55 183.47 255.84 374.01 343.06 323.99 358.50 
31–60 268.26 247.37 226.67 251.25 345.84 346.73 298.90 369.05 
61–90 270.83 253.34 208.93 263.88 317.12 297.09 267.79 313.01 
91–120 237.74 222.07 188.00 229.24 331.23 273.77 265.18 279.20 
ALL 260.64 242.73 200.46 252.17 343.11 317.98 291.15 333.91 
R4 0–30 249.92 278.17 300.79 242.21 354.90 398.33 402.63 397.37 
31–60 262.67 281.68 297.70 256.84 365.55 339.91 350.32 338.22 
61–90 252.74 296.41 311.77 273.91 339.04 328.10 357.39 322.54 
91–120 246.82 268.00 266.43 270.04 334.32 310.89 345.00 306.11 
ALL 253.28 283.11 298.88 259.46 349.79 346.79 367.83 342.93 
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Table D.3 ( continued ) 
Bid Ask 
Before shock After shock Before shock After shock 
All Insider Outsider All Insider Outsider 
R5 0–30 245.74 213.60 210.76 214.63 362.93 350.25 348.01 353.29 
31–60 259.45 219.84 189.42 227.83 357.34 316.80 295.32 329.53 
61–90 255.38 226.70 206.28 232.33 351.90 294.97 313.04 281.92 
91–120 243.84 201.84 164.12 217.49 339.84 279.68 287.09 275.39 
ALL 251.43 218.23 196.42 224.98 355.74 315.86 319.50 312.93 
R6 0–30 249.55 240.93 255.51 226.49 351.27 368.65 387.89 363.64 
31–60 263.61 277.45 283.08 270.81 329.92 384.05 374.60 386.23 
61–90 255.89 288.70 291.14 286.88 332.83 351.30 325.97 356.97 
91–120 253.10 298.28 304.87 293.97 333.65 357.49 333.33 363.84 
ALL 254.83 273.30 279.43 267.89 338.74 366.61 360.68 368.04 
R7 0–30 254.72 218.40 198.55 238.85 366.28 385.03 396.76 379.62 
31–60 254.79 241.28 228.21 250.65 344.93 350.53 346.18 351.80 
61–90 234.85 257.92 247.14 266.87 332.73 370.82 416.59 356.93 
91–120 206.47 259.92 261.43 259.06 324.55 363.74 377.35 359.29 
ALL 243.74 241.32 226.68 253.25 348.69 370.28 389.17 363.54 
R8 0–30 261.90 211.25 176.67 222.29 379.14 348.73 336.47 357.94 
31–60 252.89 227.94 179.27 242.72 355.97 316.12 297.94 329.79 
61–90 262.83 221.62 215.88 223.50 339.88 286.20 283.36 288.68 
91–120 227.85 207.02 208.00 206.70 326.20 298.89 263.13 322.24 
ALL 253.22 219.67 192.12 228.39 356.07 315.13 301.17 325.93 
Notes: Average prices of submitted bids and submitted asks per round grouped over all pre- and post-shock traders with the latter group subdivided into 
informed trader and outsider traders. 
Table D.4 
Transaction prices. 
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades 
Before shock After shock Before shock After shock Before shock After shock 
All Insider Outsider All Insider Outsider 
R1 0–30 288.18 307.50 253.89 335.88 320.59 331.57 354.11 286.50 309.29 322.37 
31–60 233.60 309.81 232.00 327.50 321.75 323.97 336.00 313.81 288.34 319.52 
61–90 262.70 296.21 265.71 305.91 307.64 306.24 311.36 304.21 289.58 303.75 
91–120 218.50 269.33 247.50 294.29 296.55 268.33 310.00 240.00 273.25 268.60 
ALL 254.03 298.87 251.21 319.19 313.37 308.48 330.32 292.67 291.79 305.64 
R2 0–30 236.61 281.80 279.57 283.75 317.77 293.26 245.71 298.90 288.94 291.14 
31–60 265.65 285.84 271.07 308.00 304.39 280.58 237.50 290.31 292.38 281.88 
61–90 277.61 236.61 261.50 222.78 301.86 242.42 197.77 260.02 295.90 241.07 
91–120 256.39 221.67 207.00 232.14 310.07 222.58 239.15 213.96 291.98 222.36 
ALL 257.40 258.23 261.43 255.47 308.08 262.65 221.60 274.26 292.37 261.64 
R3 0–30 284.73 270.95 269.23 273.75 326.83 285.90 315.80 276.56 304.75 280.92 
31–60 275.73 263.73 278.40 243.73 318.34 276.98 282.00 275.35 305.55 272.62 
61–90 263.68 265.12 270.00 260.24 299.83 255.20 264.61 249.36 289.67 258.13 
91–120 253.63 271.19 283.33 263.90 303.95 260.75 262.38 260.10 289.74 264.55 
ALL 273.38 267.01 273.84 259.43 311.29 267.94 276.23 264.32 297.87 267.64 
R4 0–30 266.05 309.60 425.00 293.86 295.32 293.11 303.76 277.14 284.75 299.98 
31–60 277.64 285.70 350.00 281.21 302.23 303.05 290.43 321.46 292.27 295.45 
61–90 268.61 276.72 258.75 279.60 291.46 296.04 288.26 302.88 281.82 288.57 
91–120 253.41 290.91 305.00 287.95 278.78 314.89 328.89 300.89 269.10 305.85 
ALL 267.20 286.99 311.94 283.64 292.41 300.63 298.20 303.33 282.50 295.12 
R5 0–30 265.64 235.24 248.57 222.80 305.39 289.18 289.17 289.19 292.14 265.84 
31–60 264.49 244.17 286.11 212.71 289.59 265.52 228.22 280.77 276.95 256.89 
61–90 247.83 246.21 280.96 208.68 306.15 259.49 253.04 262.44 282.20 254.38 
91–120 222.38 213.59 230.91 196.27 291.82 246.05 232.06 257.38 262.96 234.15 
ALL 253.45 238.48 267.94 210.97 299.41 263.98 244.28 272.55 280.32 253.87 
R6 0–30 242.73 270.34 246.92 280.03 309.28 309.73 280.26 328.40 287.29 291.79 
31–60 271.76 261.18 218.53 288.04 294.62 326.61 330.09 321.96 284.01 297.82 
61–90 260.10 281.37 238.76 298.21 296.93 325.32 317.65 333.00 281.36 304.72 
91–120 251.00 262.76 234.11 284.25 309.54 315.83 319.62 312.75 287.67 293.54 
ALL 257.50 270.94 233.53 289.48 303.15 320.53 314.72 326.01 285.08 298.16 
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Table D.4 ( continued ) 
Accepted bids Accepted asks Trades 
Before shock After shock Before shock After shock Before shock After shock 
All Insider Outsider All Insider Outsider 
R7 0–30 283.65 295.76 272.00 300.00 305.08 356.44 323.10 393.62 295.89 333.68 
31–60 281.51 274.69 295.20 270.42 324.80 328.60 310.63 343.30 301.44 311.03 
61–90 251.16 272.17 277.73 270.13 318.11 344.27 342.42 345.90 294.52 319.22 
91–120 236.68 299.48 309.38 295.71 315.82 351.60 351.28 352.08 276.25 325.98 
ALL 270.01 284.62 288.48 283.53 315.90 344.04 330.97 356.88 294.75 321.88 
R8 0–30 272.00 243.70 228.61 273.89 332.14 288.34 280.00 288.64 304.30 274.16 
31–60 282.37 250.67 254.03 243.00 327.44 285.04 292.36 283.74 303.35 271.76 
61–90 273.97 228.20 227.07 229.52 301.30 283.55 254.64 287.97 286.80 261.74 
91–120 276.11 203.78 193.50 218.73 295.77 251.32 228.80 258.58 286.04 232.44 
ALL 276.35 233.35 230.79 237.47 315.01 279.89 260.74 282.83 295.41 262.36 
Notes: Average accepted bid prices, accepted ask prices and transaction prices per round grouped over all pre- and post-shock traders with the latter group 
subdivided into informed trader and outsider traders. 
Table D.5 
Percentage differences between informed traders and indicated groups in terms of the number of 
submitted/accepted bids. 
Informed traders vs. 
pre-informed traders pre-all traders outsiders 
R1 Bids 27.11 ∗∗ −12.52 32.66 ∗∗
Asks −11.24 −23.97 ∗∗ −18.84 ∗∗
Accepted bids −71.52 ∗∗∗ −50.69 ∗∗∗ −23.68 ∗∗
Accepted asks −0.028 9.73 42.65 ∗∗
R2 Bids −56.02 −44.98 ∗∗∗ −7.55 
Asks 105.76 ∗∗∗ 91.92 ∗∗∗ 98.93 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids 41.14 −27.57 ∗∗∗ 13.85 
Accepted asks −27.87 −33.64 ∗∗∗ −40.18 ∗∗∗
R3 Bids −54.86 ∗∗∗ −65.06 ∗∗∗ −62.50 ∗∗∗
Asks 24.48 ∗∗ 9.25 20.00 ∗∗
Accepted bids −25.28 ∗∗ −8.58 83.33 
Accepted asks −40.12 ∗∗∗ −33.42 ∗∗∗ −12.33 ∗
R4 Bids 27.87 ∗∗∗ 70.77 ∗∗∗ 208.85 ∗∗∗
Asks −50.60 ∗∗∗ −58.74 ∗∗∗ −63.77 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids −54.22 ∗∗ −72.11 ∗∗∗ −77.78 ∗∗∗
Accepted asks 49.98 ∗∗ 40.28 ∗∗ 131.76 ∗∗∗
R5 Bids −40.32 ∗∗∗ −40.65 ∗∗∗ −25.07 ∗∗∗
Asks 30.48 ∗∗∗ 45.32 ∗∗∗ 60.99 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids −2.21 5.19 47.37 ∗∗
Accepted asks −29.75 ∗∗ −23.07 ∗∗ −12.25 
R6 Bids 133.90 ∗∗∗ 91.18 ∗∗∗ 101.98 ∗∗∗
Asks −47.90 ∗∗∗ −60.00 ∗∗∗ −51.18 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids −5.78 8.02 −0.80 
Accepted asks 66.42 ∗∗∗ 25.35 ∗∗ 90.38 ∗∗∗
R7 Bids 85.14 ∗∗∗ 12.17 42.59 ∗∗∗
Asks −44.67 ∗∗∗ −35.79 ∗∗∗ −28.23 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids −48.64 ∗∗ −52.85 ∗∗∗ −45.28 ∗∗∗
Accepted asks 17.11 52.20 ∗∗∗ 98.21 ∗∗∗
R8 Bids −36.61 ∗∗∗ −43.56 ∗∗∗ −39.38 ∗∗∗
Asks 102.16 ∗∗∗ 58.84 ∗∗∗ 54.35 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids 33.62 ∗ 29.42 ∗∗ 228.13 ∗∗∗
Accepted asks −3.57 −51.34 ∗∗∗ −68.33 ∗∗∗
Notes: Percentage differences between informed traders on the one hand and pre-shock informed 
traders, all pre-shock traders and post-shock outsiders on the other in terms of the average number 
of submitted/accepted bids and asks per second per trader. Wilcoxon test for significance: ∗∗∗ stands 
for p < . 01 , ∗∗ stands for p < . 05 , ∗ stands for p < . 1 . 
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Table D.6 
Percentage differences between informed traders and indicated groups in terms of the prices of 
submitted/accepted bids. 
Informed traders vs. 
pre-informed traders pre-all traders outsiders 
R1 Bids 28.40 ∗∗∗ 24.38 ∗∗∗ 15.47 ∗∗∗
Asks −7.43 ∗∗∗ 39.41 −13.50 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids 2.06 ∗∗∗ −1.11 ∗∗∗ −21.30 
Accepted asks −2.67 5.41 ∗∗∗ 12.86 
R2 Bids −23.06 ∗∗∗ −24.42 ∗∗∗ −19.57 ∗∗∗
Asks −13.58 ∗∗∗ −13.32 ∗∗∗ −2.04 
Accepted bids −10.83 ∗∗ 1.57 ∗∗∗ 2.34 
Accepted asks −19.01 ∗∗∗ −28.07 ∗∗∗ −19.20 ∗
R3 Bids −17.24 ∗∗∗ −23.09 ∗∗ −20.51 ∗∗∗
Asks −6.31 ∗∗∗ −15.14 ∗∗∗ −12.81 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids −3.30 0.17 ∗∗ 5.56 
Accepted asks −14.50 ∗∗∗ −11.26 4.50 ∗∗
R4 Bids 12.61 ∗∗∗ 18.00 ∗∗∗ 15.19 ∗∗∗
Asks 9.27 ∗∗ 5.16 ∗∗∗ 7.26 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids 5.61 ∗ 16.74 ∗∗∗ 9.98 ∗∗
Accepted asks 9.76 ∗ 1.97 −1.69 
R5 Bids −17.23 ∗∗∗ −21.88 ∗∗∗ −12.69 ∗
Asks −16.52 ∗∗∗ −10.19 ∗∗∗ 2.10 
Accepted bids −3.67 5.71 ∗∗∗ 27.00 ∗∗∗
Accepted asks −12.96 ∗∗∗ −18.41 ∗∗∗ −10.37 ∗∗
R6 Bids 12.76 ∗∗∗ 9.65 ∗∗∗ 4.31 
Asks 9.84 ∗∗∗ 6.48 −1.99 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids 5.38 −9.31 ∗∗ −19.33 ∗∗∗
Accepted asks 2.07 3.82 ∗∗∗ −3.46 
R7 Bids −13.48 ∗∗∗ −7.00 ∗∗∗ −10.49 ∗∗
Asks 7.43 11.61 7.05 ∗∗∗
Accepted bids −6.26 ∗ 6.84 ∗∗∗ 1.75 
Accepted asks 8.22 ∗∗∗ 4.77 −7.26 ∗∗∗
R8 Bids 0.43 ∗∗∗ −24.13 ∗∗∗ −15.88 ∗∗∗
Asks −16.49 ∗∗∗ −15.42 ∗∗∗ −7.60 ∗∗
Accepted bids −7.86 −16.49 −2.82 
Accepted asks −18.83 ∗∗∗ −17.23 ∗∗ −7.81 
Notes: Percentage differences between informed traders on the one hand and pre-shock informed 
traders, all pre-shock traders and post-shock outsiders on the other in terms of the average prices 
of submitted/accepted bids and asks. Wilcoxon test for significance: ∗∗∗ stands for p < . 01 , ∗∗stands 
for p < . 05 , ∗stands for p < . 1 . 
Table D.7 
Percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels. 
Type of signal Seconds after 
the signal 
The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of 
Bids Asks Accepted bids Accepted asks Bought Sold 
0–30 −59 .46 −5 .26 200 .00 21 .73 −2 .13 90 .91 
A 31–60 −62 .64 122 .58 66 .67 −25 .00 −31 .75 180 .00 
positive 61–90 −62 .65 27 .03 200 .00 −48 .48 −49 .12 107 .69 
signal 91–120 −71 .05 109 .52 −10 .00 −21 .88 −48 .21 68 .74 
ALL −63 .43 ∗∗∗ 54 .33 ∗∗∗ 61 .11 −21 .77 −34 .08 ∗∗∗ 106 .00 ∗∗∗
0–30 30 .30 25 .38 −26 .32 200 .00 40 .00 −23 .21 
A 31–60 −15 .90 −8 .93 −43 .75 63 .63 44 .44 −30 .99 
Negative 61–90 11 .11 −12 .50 −9 .52 120 .00 36 .36 −30 .36 
signal 91–120 −25 .58 −18 .75 −24 .00 83 .33 29 .16 −28 .30 
ALL −3 .40 −1 .17 −27 .84 ∗ 94 .29 ∗∗ 36 .49 ∗∗ −28 .39 ∗∗
Notes: Wilcoxon tests for significance are for the entire trading phase after the signal: ∗∗∗ stands for p < 0.01, ∗∗stands for p < 0.05, ∗stands for p < 0.1. 
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Table D.8 
Percentage differences of prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders. 
Type of signal Seconds after 
the signal 
The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in 
Bid price Ask price Accepted bid price Accepted ask price Buy price Sell price 
0–30 −5 .90 −14 .74 −38 .61 8 .12 8 .37 −31 .17 
A 31–60 −7 .27 −3 .88 −32 .85 7 .09 4 .84 −24 .10 
positive 61–90 −11 .39 −11 .34 −3 .97 0 .87 2 .42 −6 .58 
signal 91–120 16 .77 −18 .94 −20 .60 −9 .75 −7 .94 −25 .82 
ALL −6 .12 −11 .86 ∗∗∗ −21 .13 ∗∗ 3 .29 3 .57 ∗∗ −18 .88 ∗∗
0–30 23 .86 8 .16 14 .34 8 .84 34 .90 8 .50 
A 31–60 13 .15 5 .00 17 .13 −12 .89 −2 .13 10 .80 
negative 61–90 3 .91 14 .90 26 .67 6 .04 15 .39 10 .52 
signal 91–120 -9 .26 14 .04 23 .58 8 .34 5 .19 16 .48 
ALL 10 .04 10 .91 ∗∗∗ 20 .35 ∗∗∗ 1 .14 10 .12 ∗∗ 11 .06 ∗∗∗
Notes: Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ∗∗∗ stands for p < 0.01, ∗∗stands for p < 0.05, ∗ stands for p < 0.1. 
Table D.9 
Percentage differences in the trading behavior between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the markets where the sign of the 
signal does not match the domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. 
Type of signal Seconds after 
the signal 
The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition effect levels in the volume of 
Bids Asks Accepted bids Accepted asks Bought Sold 
0–30 −5 .73 84 .62 −58 .33 50 .00 9 .80 −22 .22 
A 31–60 −42 .99 13 .33 −70 .59 −15 .63 −27 .58 −48 .38 
positive 61–90 −47 .70 0 .00 −64 .29 20 .83 −22 .00 −28 .00 
signal 91–120 7 .14 65 .00 0 .00 8 .70 8 .11 −4 .55 
ALL −24 .51 ∗∗∗ 43 .86 ∗∗ −49 .12 ∗∗∗ 12 .12 −9 .69 −27 .62 ∗∗
0–30 −13 .63 −31 .90 85 .71 42 .86 41 .67 −16 .00 
A 31–60 −5 .00 −46 .94 0 .00 0 .00 −22 .72 −37 .50 
negative 61–90 −42 .31 −16 .10 114 .28 −8 .33 −21 .88 2 .22 
signal 91–120 −56 .67 −36 .72 50 .00 −5 .26 9 .52 31 .82 
ALL −32 .65 ∗∗ −33 .63 ∗∗∗ 48 .64 ∗∗ 0 .00 −5 .75 −10 .91 
Notes: Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ∗∗∗ stands for p < 0.01, ∗∗stands for p < 0.05, ∗ stands for p < 0.1. 
Table D.10 
Percentage differences of prices between markets of high and low disposition informed traders in the markets where the sign of the signal does not match 
the domain that the disposition effect levels of the informed traders are measured. 
Type of signal Seconds after the signal The percentage differences between informed traders of high and low disposition levels in 
Bid price Ask price Accepted bid price Accepted ask price Buy price Sell price 
0–30 −18 .81 1 .91 8 .28 12 .82 8 .03 5 .83 
A 31–60 −16 .62 −6 .81 28 .37 −5 .25 −2 .11 14 .10 
positive 61–90 −13 .04 23 .96 13 .32 6 .60 8 .71 9 .63 
signal 91–120 −12 .38 11 .35 26 .32 8 .43 9 .27 19 .96 
ALL −16 .16 ∗∗∗ 6 .82 19 .21 ∗∗ 4 .32 5 .83 ∗∗ 12 .17 ∗
0–30 −2 .86 −3 .20 −3 .14 23 .70 6 .40 −2 .72 
A 31–60 −4 .92 −4 .61 2 .28 15 .48 3 .16 −5 .94 
negative 61–90 17 .07 −7 .39 2 .73 26 .98 24 .58 −3 .19 
signal 91–120 8 .80 3 .01 29 .70 8 .03 9 .15 22 .79 
ALL 4 .14 −4 .20 3 .99 20 .11 ∗∗∗ 13 .19 ∗∗ −2 .04 
Notes: Wilcoxon test for significance (final row only): ∗∗∗ stands for p < 0.01, ∗∗ stands for p < 0.05, ∗ stands for p < 0.1. 
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Table D.11 
The disposition effect level distributions. 
Disposition effect levels 0 1 2 3 4 
Gain domain (%) 29.01 12.96 29.01 20.37 8.64 
Loss domain (%) 8.02 3.09 10.49 8.64 69.75 
Notes: The higher a disposition effect level in the gain (loss) domain is, the sooner (later) the sub- 
ject stops playing in the four-gains series (the four-losses series, respectively), and thus the higher 
his/her disposition effect level is. 
Table D.12 
Ex-post disposition measure. 
Gain domain Loss domain 
Pos. signal Neg. signal Pos. signal Neg. signal 
High DP 0.16 −0.39 0.33 −0.38 
Low DP 0.65 −0.36 0.36 −0.63 
Notes: The ex-post measure is calculated by subtracting the proportion of losses realized (PLR) from 
the proportion of gains realized (PGR), see Odean (1998) . The reference price used in calculating the 
measure is based on the weighted average purchase price of the shares. Portfolio updates after a 
sale are based in the last in first out (LIFO) principle meaning that when a share is sold, we assume 
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